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Abstract Internationally, attempts at developing explicit descriptions of academic
achievement standards have been steadily intensifying. The aim has been to capture the
essence of the standards in words, symbols or diagrams (collectively referred to as codi-
fications) so that standards can be: set and maintained at appropriate levels; made broadly
comparable in different specified contexts; and generally shared and understood better by
assessors, academic program directors, students, employers, quality assurance agencies and
the public at large. The scale of this practice ranges from rubrics for single assessment
tasks to national standards statements used as academic performance benchmarks for
graduates from academic programs. A critical analysis shows that the underlying
assumptions of this process are fundamentally flawed. Codifications are inherently inca-
pable of meeting the requirements because key terms lack the necessary attributes. A
fundamentally different material form of representation is therefore necessary if the ori-
ginal intentions are to be realised.
Keywords Academic standards  Achievement  Quality assurance  Rubrics 
Codification  Grading  Comparability
Introduction
In many higher education contexts, decisions on assessment and grading and in some cases
the content of courses are devolved to individual academics, small teams or program
directors. A growing practice has been to develop explicit descriptions of expected stan-
dards so they can be used by students (as producers) and academic appraisers. The basic
idea is simple. Specifications of desired outcomes and standards are compact, reproducible
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and portable. If all relevant parties work to the same set of specifications, the belief is that
appropriate levels of consistency and comparability will result. This article is primarily a
critique of that hypothesis. It is not about setting standards, although that is a crucial topic
in its own right.
The specifications can be as simple as a teacher developing and using a rubric to
improve transparency and accountability about what is expected from students when they
produce complex responses to an assessment task. Students can shape their work
accordingly, and markers can mark to the same rules. At the other extreme is a quality
assurance agency with legislative authority to ensure that, as far as possible, all graduates
from degree programs satisfy minimum requirements of knowledge and skills in various
disciplines and professions. (Instead of a quality assurance agency, a voluntary consortium
of institutions may pursue the same quality-related goal). General practice is to set out
degree expectations in the form of learning outcomes, of which one subset is to be attained
by all students graduating from all degree programs in all institutions, regardless of field.
This subset usually goes under a label such as ‘graduate’ or ‘generic’ followed by ‘out-
comes’, ‘skills’, ‘capabilities’, ‘competencies’ or ‘attributes’. Typical generic outcomes
are: critical analysis; problem solving; locating, evaluating and using information; origi-
nality, initiative and creativity; and effective communication. Other expected outcomes are
specific to particular disciplines, fields and professions. Broad comparability of achieve-
ments of graduates from different higher education institutions within a given jurisdiction
would also facilitate student mobility with credit transfer. Extending comparability across
provincial or national borders would facilitate mutual recognition of professional qualifi-
cations. This commitment to assuring the overall quality of higher education has resulted in
significant investment in developing comparability procedures.
The initiative along these lines with the widest international reach is the Tuning project,
which is part of the well-documented Bologna Process. Although Tuning began in the
European Union, the aims and methodology are also being pursued in some non-EU
European countries, the USA, Canada, Latin America and Africa. Parallel initiatives, not
under the Tuning banner, are in progress in the UK with its ‘subject benchmark statements’
and in Australia with its ‘threshold learning outcomes’. In large-scale implementations,
wide-ranging consultative processes in different disciplines, fields and professions
(including sciences, technologies and mathematics) seek to identify common ground
without standardisation of curriculum, teaching approaches or testing procedures. The
goals of comparability and equivalence are not intended to produce uniformity. Extensive
consultation should also, as a side benefit, foster a sense of ownership of the final result.
However, the analysis in this article will show why consensus on the wording of the
outcome statements does not necessarily result in consensus on underlying achievement
standards.
Terminology
In this article, codification and coding have distinct meanings. Explicit descriptions or
statements composed of words, diagrams or symbols are referred to as codifications. Laws,
policies, game rules, regulations and instruction manuals are all examples of codifications.
To a large extent, so are the scientific journal articles that report discoveries which can be
replicated by others. Ideally, codifications will ‘serve to ‘‘reconstitute’’ knowledge at a
later time, in a different place, or by a different group of individuals’ (Amin and Cohendet
2004 p. 21). In the context of assessment and grading, codifications include: rubrics,
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criteria-standards matrices, marking guides, scoring schemes, grade descriptors, minimum
(threshold) standards, subject or discipline benchmark statements, and graduate attributes.
These are regarded as primary tools for communicating, transferring and sharing ‘standards
knowledge’ among learners, academics, accreditation agencies, professional bodies and
employers.
At the course level, standards codifications may include descriptions which differentiate
two or more levels of achievement. Each level is given a label, which is its code, typically
an alphanumerical symbol or word phrase such as Pass/Fail; A, B, C, D, F; Distinction,
Merit, Credit, Pass, Fail; or 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0. The achievement information represented in
codes is highly condensed and needs contextualisation for meaningful interpretation.
Codification is the act of developing explicit descriptions of standards, while coding is the
act of representing a level of achievement by a mark, rating or grade.
Another distinction is important. In ordinary usage, criteria and standards are often
used interchangeably and the context makes the meaning clear. The problem in many
discussions on educational achievement is that the meanings of these two terms slide
around and lead to confusion. In this article, keeping them distinct serves a useful purpose.
A criterion is a property or quality used in appraising student responses to assessment
tasks, whereas a standard is a minimum achievement level used as a reference point when
judging the quality of a student’s work so the appropriate code can be assigned to it (Sadler
1985, 1987). Standards are underpinned by criteria (as qualities) but criteria as qualities
can make sense without reference to standards.
Certain concepts and terminology used in the analysis resemble those used in semiotics,
but no appeal is made to semiotic theory as such. The term specifier refers to a word or
short phrase used as the label for something; the term specified refers to the thing so
identified. The specified may be a property, a physical substance, an amount, a class, a
concept, or something else altogether, abstract or concrete. Particular specifiers and
specifieds take on not only meaning but also practical relevance as a duality embedded in
actual contexts. Later on, the term referent is also used to denote a specific instance or
example of something referred to by a specifier.
Structure of the argument
The argument about to be made is that for a codification to be adequate for the carriage of
academic achievement standards, certain properties must characterise its principal elements.
These principal elements are qualities (or characteristics) of student works or performances
and amounts or levels of those qualities which must be present for a particular standard to be
attained. Qualities which refer to achievement or performance are not directly observable or
measurable. Levels of attainment or achievement are compounded from inferences based on
evidence such as student responses to assessment tasks. The argument has two branches.
First, achievement is not a physical variable but a concept which has fuzzy boundaries.
Second, the words used to designate amounts are elastic in their interpretation. The
meanings for the principal elements, qualities and amounts alike, are inherently context
dependent. They are not and cannot be standardised. Since contexts differ, a stand-alone
codification cannot be interpreted in a unique way by different people in different contexts at
different times. Codifications therefore cannot ‘hold’ standards by serving as stable refer-
ence points for judging and reporting different levels of student achievement.
This conclusion is independent of whether the description is a rubric for a single
assessment task or a benchmark standard for an entire degree program. It is also
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independent of the specificity of the descriptors—coarse, fine or superfine. Codifications
may well indicate dimensions or aspects of importance, but are theoretically incapable of
adequately representing standards. If the goal of ‘assuring’ standards in a variety of con-
texts without implementing uniform curriculum and assessment practices is considered
worthwhile, it has to be approached through other means.
The argument is developed by analysing the attributes of the word elements in three
examples of educational achievement ‘standards’. In order to clarify the essential character
of the principal elements, a codified standard from an entirely different field is discussed.
This external codification is able to hold and convey the intended standard, and provides a
clean, stark contrast to codified standards in education. Some structural similarities exist,
but the differences are significant enough to establish that the two types of codifications are
situated in distinct categories, and differ not simply in degree. However, the external
codification cannot serve as a model for emulation in the academic context, or be adapted
to it.
Typical higher education ‘standards’ codifications
The following three examples of codified achievement standards all involve multiple
criteria and are adaptations from real cases. Subject or discipline identifiers have been
removed and grammatical forms within each example have been made consistent. The
specifiers of interest refer to qualitative and quantitative characteristics. The qualitative
specifiers identify the criteria—the qualities, properties, characteristics or features of
interest. The quantitative specifiers are the amounts or levels required to qualify for a
particular classification or gradation.
Table 1 shows a format applied to threshold (minimum) capabilities expected of all
graduates and approved by a quality assurance agency. A complementary table could show
somewhat higher overall performance standards that are expected of the majority of (rather
than all) graduates, making two fixed reference levels. The standards in Table 2 are similar
in format, with the four levels matching an institutional grade scale. The descriptors are
intended to refer to achievement levels reached by the end of each course. Table 3 sets out
a typical rubric for written or other extended responses to assessment tasks. Some
Objective Structured Clinical Examinations (OSCEs) make use of similar scoring rubrics.
The rubric in Table 3 has three criteria cross-tabulated with four levels of performance
(‘standards’) for each criterion as spelled out by the text in the cells. Scoring involves
deciding which text cell on each criterion best fits the student work under scrutiny. An
overall score may be arrived at by inspection of the patterns of cells selected or, if numbers
are assigned to the cells, by weighting and adding the numbers.
In Table 3, the main criteria are supplemented by more criteria embedded in the text
cells: accuracy, integration, logical development and support for assertions. Potentially,
each could be elaborated further. Integration, for example, could be expanded as ‘how well
a work comes together as a whole rather than as separate pieces, how the different aspects
of the work are linked and smoothly combined into a unified entirety’. Although containing
redundancies, this filling out of the meaning may be useful to a student or a marker. But
observe that this expansion of integration shows how it intersects conceptually with other
stated criteria, specifically consistency of focus, relatedness of key ideas, support for
assertions and progression of ideas. Weaknesses in any of the latter actively reduce the
level of integration. This phenomenon is common in achievement codifications. Criteria
which may appear to be distinct in the abstract are often found to overlap, and occasionally
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even to interfere, with other criteria when an attempt is made to apply them meticulously.
The various properties are not therefore mutually independent but, whether taken together
or in clusters, refer to compounded qualities and meanings.
Difficulties of a somewhat different type arise through the particular criteria that are
explicitly or implicitly embodied in a rubric. In the process of rubric construction, choices
among criteria have to be made. Some criteria are included, others not. It is immaterial
whether this occurs by deliberate decision, by not thinking of some criteria at the time, or
by not even being aware of the existence of a larger pool of potentially eligible criteria or
how large such a pool might be.
In practice, unless expert assessors consciously restrict their judgments to the criteria
actually listed in the codification, they know that other criteria (or aspects) can and on
occasion do emerge during the actual processes of making appraisal decisions (Sadler
2009a). Some criteria may apply to most works, others universally, but is it not uncommon
Table 1 Typical graduate learning outcomes for an undergraduate degree
Each graduate is expected to demonstrate:
Comprehensive understanding and systematic awareness of the basic sciences fundamental to both the
discipline and professional practice;
Ability to locate, evaluate, summarise and apply primary and secondary sources of information;
High-level proficiency in a range of scientific and clinical techniques, including collection, analysis and
critical interpretation of data;
Ability to apply principles and techniques to solve problems in routine and novel situations;
Willingness to take personal responsibility and exercise initiative in unpredictable and complex
situations;
Capacity to make informed and reliable judgements, in a professional manner, including decisions with
incomplete data;
Skill in communicating effectively the scientific aspects of their work to both specialist and non-
specialist audiences; and
Competence in constructing reasoned arguments to support their actions and positions on the ethical and
social impact of research in the discipline and professional practice.
Table 2 ‘Standards’ descriptors for grades A to D in a course or module
Grades Standards descriptors
A Deep, broad knowledge of the course content; strong evidence of highly original thought; excellent
analytical and critical abilities as well as a thorough grasp of the topic from both background
reading and independent research; exemplary organisational, rhetorical and presentational skills
in oral and written modes
B Generally adequate knowledge and understanding of most of the topics, with higher levels of
mastery in some areas; moderate level of critical and abstract thinking; some originality and
independence in evaluating and organising information; generally competent in communicating
through written and oral presentations
C Broad knowledge and comprehension of much of the primary course content; some ability to apply
knowledge in routine situations, but markedly less ability in novel contexts; analytic and critical
ability limited; written communication skills mostly sound except for extended or complex
material
D Narrow perspective and marginal knowledge of the field; very limited capacity to confront non-
routine issues or problems; virtually no ability to locate and assemble information
independently; notable lack of rigour in analytic thinking; oral and written presentations often
inaccurate, lacking in logic and inclusive of irrelevant material
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to make an appraisal that invokes a criterion that is simply more salient to a particular work
than to others. Experienced assessors are open to those criteria that come legitimately into
play only rarely and build these into their judgments when they apply. Fixed codifications
do not allow for such eventualities. This reflects the reality that it may not be possible to
predict with certainty the variety that can arise through students’ ingenuity, originality and
creativity. Obviously, even detailed elaborations do not exhaust all the properties that
potentially have a bearing on determinations of quality or complex performance. Although
the cross-tabulation in Table 3 may appear to be neat and tidy, latent fuzziness in its
qualitative specifiers emerges as soon as it is applied. Finer and finer grained elaborations
cannot fix the problem.
In the direction opposite to expansion, it is sometimes useful to conceptualise certain
criteria in terms of a higher-order criterion. Still in Table 3, consistency of focus, com-
prehensiveness of material, accuracy, and addressing the set task (which are all stated or
implied by the text cell entries) are all elements of the first main criterion, relevance. At the
next level up, the three main criteria (relevance, analysis, and writing and presentation) are
aspects of overall quality. At that point, the upwards process effectively stops; quality
functions as the backstop criterion. In Tables 1 and 2, the backstop criterion for perfor-
mance in a course or program would be competence, attainment, proficiency or achieve-
ment, all of which are high-level, integrative, abstract concepts. Ultimately, a level of
performance is inferred by competent assessors who make professional judgments from
evidence, which includes responses to assessment tasks and observations of behaviour.
Certain skills can be practiced to the point where the level acquired can be judged in a
straightforward way, but professional competence requires not only discrete knowledge
and skills but also the ability to select and orchestrate them in appropriate ways to
accomplish complex tasks independently, on demand and in a range of contexts (Sadler
2013a).
Table 3 A rubric for written responses to an assessment task
Criterion Level A Level B Level C Level D
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Now consider the quantitative specifiers. Common usage recognises that the term
‘quantitative’ covers amount or size generally, without being restricted to the use of
numbers (for measurements, counts, indices or probability). This differs from the practice
common in distinguishing quantitative research methods from qualitative methods. In
statements of educational standards, quantity is generally indicated by combinations of
quantifiers, modifiers and hedge words, of which there are plenty available. Embedded in
Table 2 are these: excellent, strong, moderate, marginal, thorough, limited and adequate.
Others are either modifiers of these or hedge words: generally, very, mostly, some, often,
markedly and virtually. Which one of these is appropriate in a particular case depends on
where the underlying trigger level is set. ‘Moderate’, for instance must have some sort of
lower and upper thresholds, but who is to say how much is enough to justify the use of that
term? Where is the boundary between ‘limited’ and ‘moderate’, or between ‘moderate’ and
‘strong’? Incidentally, the mention of ‘inaccurate’ at the D-level presumably implies
acceptable levels of accuracy for the grades above it in level. Are these to be
differentiated?
The boundary problem also exists when a criterion is mentioned unaccompanied by any
form of quantifier. For example skill, capacity, willingness and competence all function as
both criteria and standards in Table 1. None of these is an all-or-nothing affair. How much
skill is required for it to be said that graduates ‘possess’ or ‘can demonstrate’ it? An
underlying threshold is implied, as it is with many of the listings of graduate learning
outcomes, whether they carry the label ‘standard’ or not. As a separate issue, ability,
capacity and competence each occurs in the listing of only one attribute. Is some subtle
differentiation intended? And does ‘skill’ mean exactly the same thing in different contexts
within the same degree program?
Normally, asking these sorts of questions would be regarded as pedantry, but this is a
fundamental issue. The elements in progressively more detailed descriptions are intended
to make meanings clearer but their specifiers are in turn of the same essence and type as
those of the main elements. There is no escape. All of them are fuzzy and do not lock
things down definitively. Only concrete cases and contextualisation can allow appropriate
interpretations to be found, a matter taken up later. But clearly, there are ‘limits as to how
far the process of decomposition should proceed. While on the surface it may appear that
the more detail the better, in practice there is a danger in becoming swamped with
atomistic detail, at the same time losing sight of what the overall [judgment] is all about’
(Sadler 1985, p. 289). Lakoff (1973) described the situation this way: ‘[S]tudents of
language…have long been attuned to the fact that natural language concepts have vague
boundaries and fuzzy edges and that, consequently, natural language sentences will very
often be neither true, nor false, nor nonsensical, but rather true to a certain extent and false
to a certain extent, true in certain respects and false in other respects’ (p. 458). The
interpretation problem is not one of granularity but of category; as mentioned above,
greater specificity does not resolve it.
A typical fully specified industrial standard: eye protectors
Modern societies cannot function satisfactorily without systems of codified standards. The
standards formulation selected for contrast is Australian and New Zealand Standard
AS/NZS 1337.1:2010. It deals with a particular range of eye and face protectors appro-
priate to safety in a variety of workplaces, and the full standards specifications run to 109
pages. The interest here is in how the standards are specified, and the characteristics of the
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key elements. Six of the key qualitative specifiers—the criteria—for the particular class of
protectors formally designated as Medium Impact Resistance are, in summary form:
Impact resistance of oculars (lenses); Transmittance and absorption of electromagnetic
radiation; Thermal stability; Air flow (ventilation); Resistance to dust, splash, ignition,
corrosion and other hazards; and Optical power. In the published standards, each main
criterion is expanded until the detail is sufficient to purpose. Impact resistance, for
instance, is expanded into: protection against shattering, penetration and fragmentation of
the oculars; and distortion of the assembly that could allow contact between a projectile or
debris and the eye. The criteria are mutually independent for purposes of assessing the
level of protection offered. The backstop criterion is simple—safety for the eyes and face.
The quantitative specifiers—the standards—set minimum performance levels for each
criterion. For protectors to be stamped with the authorised symbol of the standard with
which they comply prior to marketing, the evaluation rule is unequivocal: failure to
meet all performance levels produces failure overall. No trading off is permitted. Only the
performance specifications are set; manufacturers are therefore free to decide both the
design and the materials for eye protectors.
The structure of the quantitative side of impact resistance standards is definitive, and
specifies standardised testing apparatus. These non-negotiable test procedures are integral
to the specification of performance levels, as the following extract shows:
Method for the determination of Medium Impact Resistance
Step (c). Project a nominally 6 mm diameter steel ball at a velocity of 45 ?1.5,
–0 m/s onto each of the following impact sites, repeating Steps (a), (b) and (e) for
each impact site: (i) At the reference point of each ocular as given in Clause 2.4.1;
(ii) At normal to the surface of the frame above the ocular, within 20 mm of the mid-
line (as given in Figure 2.4) of the frame; and (iii) At 90 to straight ahead along the
ocular through the centres of the front of both eyes of the headform (Appendix M,
M4 Procedure, p. 79).
The conditions for passing the medium impact resistance test are equally explicit:
2.6.2 Performance criteria.
When tested in accordance with Appendix M, an ocular shall be considered to have
failed: (a) if it cracks through its entire thickness into two or more pieces; (b) if more
than 5 mg of the ocular material becomes detached from a part of the ocular surface
remote from the surface struck by the ball; (c) if the ball passes through the ocular; or
(d) if contact is made with either eye of the test headform by the ball, frame, ocular
or any part or fragment of these (p. 20).
The combined specifications make reference to: concrete objects or their parts (ocular,
frame, headform); materials (steel); shapes and configurations (ball, diameter, centre,
midpoint, surface); physical dimensions and variables (length, time, mass, velocity, angle);
standardised units measured on standardised scales (millimetres, seconds, grams, degrees);
numerical measurements (5 mg, 6.00 mm, 45 m/s, 90); and one measurement tolerance
(?1.5, -0.0 m/s). None of these elements requires judgment or further interpretation; none
foreshadows that finer grained specifications could be helpful. For all practical purposes,
the possibility of hierarchical decomposition that is possible with achievement standards
can go no further for impact resistance as a property. It simply stops.
The sections of the AS/NZS 1337 standards specifications that apply to various levels of
eye protection, including Medium Impact Resistance protectors, are arbitrary in that they
were decided by human agency following a set of procedures laid down in 2010 jointly by
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Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand, the authorities which published the
standards. These procedures employ consultative processes involving wide representation
from experts in workplace health and safety, manufacturers of safety equipment, end users
and the public at large. They constitute, therefore, true standards. Once settled, the stan-
dards specifications remain fixed until the next round of formal revision. (The previous
version was published in 1992.) To the extent that the constituent terms require inter-
pretation, the interpretation is made in a direct and secure way—the specifications can be
taken literally and applied by any competent person who understands the text, formulae
and diagrams; has access to appropriate materials and testing equipment; and possesses the
know-how to use them all properly. The person must know, for instance, the meanings of
terms—steel, ball, 6 mm, diameter, velocity, 45 m/s, and so on. However, those meanings
are identical within any scientifically literate community and would be interpreted and
applied in exactly the same way. They are definitive and intrinsically valid, with no matters
left to individual human judgment at the point of implementation. Furthermore, the various
criteria are separable in concept and practice. Test rigs can be built on demand at any time
or place. Provided all the rules are followed exactly, various instantiations of the testing are
equivalent in composition, functionality and rigour—and produce the same results.
These types of standards possess their authority not only through the organisations
which issue them and monitor their use but also through the universality and precision of
their formulation. The relative aspect of word-quantifiers in education signified by such
words as high, moderate and low does not arise. A 6 mm steel ball is not large, medium or
small; it is simply 6 mm in diameter. Of course, whether Medium Impact Resistance is
adequate for a particular workplace remains a matter for case-by-case judgment, but that
issue does not form part of the standards specifications.
Further analysis of achievement standards codifications
Qualifiers, modifiers and hedge words in educational standards statements are typically
interpreted relatively rather than absolutely. For rubrics, their meanings may be limited to a
cohort. This applies to both criteria as properties or features (such as accuracy, integration,
logic and precision) and quantitative specifiers (high, some, poor, frequent). Superlatives in
ordinary language are relativistic. A work that is ‘outstanding’ literally stands out from
some background, either real and immediate, or recalled from memory. The same applies
to extraordinary, exceptional, excellent and superb. In some situations, the contextuality is
made explicit, as when an awarded grade is tempered with such phrases as ‘for this cohort’,
‘for the types of students enrolled in this program’, ‘given the disruptions this semester’, or
‘for studies terminating at the bachelor level’. In general, the specifiers used in achieve-
ment standard codifications statements are highly elastic. Their interpretations readily
expand or contract so as to ‘fit’ or cover a particular reality, with perhaps some modifi-
cation by residual knowledge about other contexts, especially those previously encountered
personally by a marker.
Cohort-based ‘standards’ exploit the elasticity of the terms in the codification. A
practice recommended in many books on assessment is to begin marking or grading a batch
of student works by first establishing a baseline. This involves scanning and reviewing a
‘range sample’ of student works to get a feel for the broad level of performance. On a
larger scale, a higher education institution may deliberately take into account the social
backgrounds and entry levels of its students and interpret the outcome specifications
accordingly. Such practices openly legitimate cohort-based existential ‘standards’ which
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are incompatible with the concept of true standards. Elasticity in the terms also explains
why a particular codification (such as a rubric) can be found to apply equally well to first
year undergraduate, final year and graduate level student works. The codification does not
change; the meanings of the specifiers are reinterpreted to accommodate whatever level of
student work they are applied to. Although that reflects the power and flexibility of lan-
guage generally, it is of little value when trying to anchor and convey standards through
codification alone. Research on the elasticity of meanings of common terms has been the
subject of research for over 50 years (Helson et al. 1956; Helson 1959), and is an element
of the wider phenomenon of human adaptability which pervades human lives and the
making of meaning.
Does supplementing codifications with exemplars supply the necessary anchorage? The
combination of a codification and its ‘associated’ exemplars requires a two-stage inter-
pretation. As a set of words, a codification is not, in general, capable of describing a
particular exemplar exactly. It cannot function as the ‘decider’ as to whether or not another
instance qualifies as a member of the class. By their very nature, codifications of educa-
tional standards are generic descriptions of classes of things. For some works, aspects
which are crucial in making correct determinations of quality or level may not appear in
the codification at all. Works which competent appraisers regard as of equivalent quality or
level typically differ from one another, sometimes in significant ways. In other words,
people can and do regularly make judgments about different objects and classify them in
the same ‘worth-class’. Wittgenstein (1953) labelled this as noticing ‘family resemblances’
that are sufficiently pronounced for things to be safely classified; Dreyfus and Dreyfus
(1986) called it ‘holistic similarity recognition’ (p. 28). Despite substantial differences in
content or form, different student works are regularly judged to be equivalent in value,
worth or quality. Competent assessors notice or perceive different patterns of character-
istics (cues), which they are often able to identify explicitly only during or after a judgment
is made. Contrary to the assumptions underlying the principles of codification, this is by no
means an insurmountable problem. Indeed, ‘[t]he process by which equivalent judgments
can result from different patterns of cues is central to any theory of judgment’ (Einhorn
et al. 1979).
Finally, the process of codification places a specific interposition between the primary
evidence of achievement and the grading judgment. This naturally puts the focus of
attention on the content and structure of the codification (which is concrete) rather on than
the underlying standard it is supposed to represent (which is abstract). Abercrombie’s
(1969) work on influences which bias human perception is salutatory: ‘How to tell students
what to look for without telling them what to see is the dilemma of teaching’. It is also the
dilemma of making appraisals. A codification is inherently constraining, even more so
when accompanied by ‘exemplars’, because its formulation does not lend itself to the
admission of new types and configurations of qualities that constitute overall quality.
Although codification may purport to increase the efficiency of informational exchange,
even a fully effective formulation of [codification ? exemplars] would come at a poten-
tially significant cost—rigidity and uniformity. ‘The need for [codifications that are]
mutually understandable within the organization imposes a uniformity requirement on the
behavior of the participants. They [become] specialized in the information capable of being
transmitted by the [codifications], so that … they learn more in the direction of their
activity and become less efficient in acquiring and transmitting information not easily fitted
in the [codification]. Hence, the organization itself serves to mold the behavior of its
members’ (Arrow 1974, p. 56–57). (Arrow’s original term ‘code’ has been replaced here
by ‘codification’, the term most commonly used in current research literature.) What is
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required is to hold firm on the standards to be applied but be quite open to different ways of
seeing the underlying standard expressed.
A possible way forward
The object of the exercise is clear enough—how to facilitate trustworthy discriminations
among levels of academic achievement in a devolved system—but the analysis above, cast
as it is in the form of a contrast between standards which are and which are not fully
specifiable, points to the futility of codification as an approach, despite widespread com-
mitment to it. In their critical analyses of modern trends towards codification in assessment
criteria, standards and quality assurance, Gonza´lez-Arnal and Burwood (2003) concluded
that the assumption of the positive benefits of codification in higher education is deeply—
and for the most part uncritically—embedded in academic culture. This section is an
attempt at resolving the apparent dilemmas in moving forward on standards by responding
to three questions. If codifications fail to convey standards, are ‘standards’ needed at all? If
so, is some form of external representation of them, a material form, necessary? (‘Material
form’ is a term drawn from copyright law. It refers to any form of information storage that
is sufficiently permanent or stable for the information to be perceived, identified, repro-
duced and communicated on demand.) The final question is this: If codification with or
without exemplars is not the way ahead, what other approach could potentially serve to
anchor achievement standards for future use?
Early in this paper, a distinction was made between criteria and standards, but that
conceptualisation of standards did not go far enough. ‘Standard’ turns out to be a trou-
blesome concept in higher education because different meanings can be implied even in the
same seemingly straightforward discussion. At this point, the meaning of a standard is
given a bit more formal substance. This is necessary for developing answers to the three
questions. A standard, then, is to be taken as a ‘definite degree of academic achievement
established by authority, custom, or consensus and used as a fixed reference point for
reporting a student’s level of attainment’ (Sadler 2013b). This is consistent with the usage
for eye protector standards, and equally for a wide range of other standards in society. The
standards are performance or reference levels set by a recognised authority as a deliberate
act. As and when necessary, such standards may be reset, also as a deliberate act.
To say ‘standards are falling’ to mean that student performance levels are steadily
decreasing uses the term inappropriately because it interprets standards as empirically
determined average levels of performance. This is incompatible with standards as fixed
reference levels. If standards could be fixed and held stable over time, student achievement
could be graded with integrity (Sadler 2009b), the performance of different cohorts of
students could be compared, research on the effectiveness of teaching could be carried out,
and general achievement levels in an academic program or institution could be mapped and
evaluated longitudinally. This would therefore go a long way towards addressing the
quality assurance question. The need for standards as fixed reference levels is therefore
crucial.
Where teachers create codifications in the form of rubrics or criteria-standards speci-
fications, the ostensible purposes are to increase marking transparency and to guide
appraisers in their marking. (That said, teachers may not establish the full meaning and
implications of even their own guidelines until they have carried out a baseline survey as
described above.) Particularistic ‘standards’ that are set for and within courses do not
satisfy the above definition because they are disconnected from similarly devised
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‘standards’ in other courses. Suppose that a group of assessors in different courses col-
laborate to moderate standards among themselves, perhaps even across degree programs
and institutions. Even these are not true standards, because they lack anchorage; one
group’s ‘standards’ may well differ from another group’s ‘standards’. Besides, there would
still be no way of detecting whether the ‘standards’ are drifting over time. Comparability
across both contexts and time requires that standards are not only held in common, but also
kept secure until the need arises to revise them.
Moving to the second question, must what is to be made secure be expressed in material
form? The extensive literature on the limitations on human information processing indi-
cates that it is. Assessors in general find it difficult to hold standards constant in their heads
in any sort of absolute way that allows them to be applied on demand (Stewart et al. 2005).
Without anchorage, even ‘memorised’ reference points for judgments adapt to the cir-
cumstances. However, people generally can retain the ability to compare things and make
consistent discriminations among them, a finding which is well documented. They are just
not good at holding absolutes unaided. It turns out that judgments among relevant objects
in new settings can be made reliably provided the objects are considered two at a time, to
facilitate pair-wise or ‘paired’ comparisons (Thurstone 1927; Saaty 1977). If standards can
be expressed in a material form which is similar enough to the objects being appraised for
their relative quality to be determined, (new) works can be put up against (fixed) standards,
and the anchorage issue is resolved. This would permit competent assessors to make
consistent standards-referenced judgments of even single works at arbitrary times and
places. If all this sounds highly theoretical, the proposed solution is relatively
straightforward.
An alternative to codification
Although the qualitative and quantitative terms used in codifications of achievement
standards lack the necessary linguistic properties to carry true standards successfully,
words are the very stuff of explanations. They can play an indispensable part in assembling
a material form useful for conveying an achievement standard in a way that is consistent
with how complex qualitative judgments are made. The material form is not of the
underlying standard itself, which is an abstraction, but of the effect of applying the stan-
dard, referred to here as an instantiation (of a judgment against the standard). This is
similar in principle to an approach suggested by Popham (1994) in a somewhat related
context. A way to do this for a single student’s grade in a single course is to first identify a
body of student work that is judged, for example, as definitely worth a Pass—clearly not a
Fail but not up to Merit level. The level of achievement is inferred from this body of
student work. Such an instantiation of a judgment is indicative of the underlying standard
of Pass. (In a standard-setting situation, this decision would need to be made after
appropriate deliberation among competent judges.) This implies sensory input which
results in an evaluative conclusion about a concrete object or observed behaviour.
When agreement is reached, the next step would be to explain exactly why such a
classification is warranted. Such an explanation would draw attention to those aspects of
the work, whether positive or negative, that support the decision, and ideally would make
use of at least some of the ‘graduate outcomes’ listed in the Introduction to this article for
reasons explained in (Sadler 2013b). Such an explanation, if properly constructed, means
that the text would function as an evaluative description of an actual concrete object. If the
text is an adequate account of the evaluative judgment, the meaning of its specifiers will be
fully contextualised and clear. The specifiers in the text then have a true referent (in the
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semiotic sense). The match between the two is what matters, because all the qualitative and
quantitative specifiers have their interpretations fixed or grounded in reality.
The language used to validate the judgment need not be drawn from a standard
vocabulary if other words explain it better; the assessor has complete control over how the
explanation is structured and phrased and also the granularity of what is reported. If how
the work comes together as a whole is particularly noteworthy but not in terms of any
easily identifiable characteristics, the justification may find such terms as flair, flow or
artistry more appropriate than any others. The fact that the meanings of these terms are
ordinarily hard to pin down is countered by the particularity of the referent to which they
specifically refer. As another example, a particular work may show an exceedingly high
level of mastery over the task but achieve this by quite unorthodox means, such as
deliberately breaking some rule or ignoring some convention expressly for the strength this
gives the work as a whole. Attention would need to be drawn to this.
The features of the object and the text of the justification for the assigned code therefore
stand in a mutually reciprocal relationship. The aim in constructing the text is to give
conceptual substance to the qualitative specifiers and reduce the elasticity of the quanti-
tative specifiers. Aspects that are latent for the valuation do not need to have attention
drawn to them. The set of criteria would be deliberately left open to allow the description
to be fully responsive to the properties of the student work. This is a far cry from the
emphasis on characteristic features around which codifications are drawn up, and also from
properties held in common. Perception and professional judgments clearly play funda-
mental roles in achievement standards systems, and both need to be tuned. On the per-
ception front, an aspect is considered worthy of mention in a valuation when two
conditions are satisfied. The first is that the identification of the aspect has clearly passed
some perception threshold (which is in essence quantitative). The second is that the aspect
has an intimate connection with the overall judgment, regardless of whether its identifi-
cation was part of deliberative judgment making—or simply followed the final decision
reflectively. Both conditions are involved in appraising work through evaluative eyes.
Clearly, a standard as an abstraction cannot be adequately inferred from a single
instantiation. What is needed is a range of instantiations for, say, each grade band, each
instantiation consisting of a triplet composed of actual student work, the assigned code
(mark or grade) and the justification. Each instantiation offers a viewing point (as it were)
on the (abstract) standard, the aim being to fix the standard’s position in the evaluative
decision space (to invoke the language of satellite-based positioning systems). The number
of points to be fixed has to be enough to fix an independent baseline for assigning the
appropriate code to each judgment. Triplets provide both the mechanism and the critical
insights into the standards being applied, and have potential for accelerating the process of
experiential learning as compared with unguided induction purely from extensive sets of
examples.
If this conjures up the prospect of a mountainous archive of triplets, a few comments
may help to allay fears. First, a critical interface in any standards system is the one between
satisfactory and unsatisfactory, pass and fail. The greatest return on investment is probably
to be had by focusing on that interface. This is what ‘benchmark’, ‘threshold’, or ‘mini-
mally competent’ decisions are essentially about. The second most critical point is prob-
ably the level of attainment necessary to warrant award of the highest available code.
Intermediate codings can be interpolated by capable assessors, and should be left with them
as part of their professional academic responsibility.
In practice, several refinements would be necessary for such a system to work. The
above description of triplets has referred only to student work. By itself, student work
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does not constitute the full evidence required for a judgment of achievement. An
important consideration is the structure and quality of the assessment task—its design
and its specifications. An assessment task which is deficient in its design or specifications
cannot be relied upon to elicit valid student responses. Poor quality evidence of a
student’s level of achievement must not be confused with evidence of poor achievement.
To that must be added the conditions under which responses were produced. All this so
far should not be taken as sufficient on its own as a way of fixing standards in an
assessment system characterised by distributed responsibility for making judgments
about student achievement. An investment needs to be made in educating assessors into
the overall strategy, especially its rationale. Just as the terms in industrial standards
codifications assume a scientifically literate community, so the development of corre-
sponding standards literacy is necessary in higher education. Consideration of these
topics, which are significant in their own right, lies outside the scope of this article, but
details of some approaches to them are outlined in two companion articles (Sadler 2011,
2013b).
This proposal for an alternative material form has a clear precedent in principle in the
approach taken by biological taxonomists. They had long sought tight codifications for a
biological classification system for organisms, but the complexity of life forms seemed to
defy all attempts at definitive classification. The history of taxonomic development,
including several myths that received wide currency only later shown to be incorrect,
attempts at formulating biological divisions by means of common features, the subsequent
use of selected (exemplary) specimens accompanied by detailed descriptions, and the place
of the relevant literacy among competent practitioners (including the centrality of pro-
fessional judgments) have been systematically documented by Winsor (2003). In short,
human judgment and the acceptance of family resemblances rather than an insistence on
sharply defined boundaries between divisions have remained essential ingredients in tax-
onomic processes all the way from Linnaeus onward.
Contextual and historical note
The issue of codification and specifiability is as ancient as Socrates (Dreyfus and Dreyfus
1984). Modern research on the topic has been published in fields as diverse as agriculture,
artificial intelligence, business, control theory, economics, engineering, higher education,
history and philosophy of science, linguistics, management, medicine, microbiology,
organisation theory, philosophy, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, social anthropology
and taxonomy. Despite differences in terminology and reasoning, strong elements of
convergence have been identified (Needham 1975; Winsor 2003). Knowledge transfer or
dissemination by means of descriptive statements stored in appropriate media is theoret-
ically possible only under certain conditions. The practical problem is deciding whether
knowledge of a certain type satisfies the conditions.
In this article, the analysis has dealt primarily with the fuzziness and elasticity of
specifiers. Only touched upon briefly is a complementary line of analysis which leads to the
same conclusion. It emphasises specifieds rather than specifiers, in particular, specifieds
related to certain classificatory systems. When membership of a class is based on a dis-
tinctive set of attributes which all class members have in common, codification of the rules
for class membership is theoretically possible. However, codification is difficult or
impossible when this condition is not met. Such classes abound. Some are concepts which
are part of everyday life and discourse, among them ‘fairness’, ‘game’ and ‘furniture’.
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Wittgenstein (1953) puzzled repeatedly over what makes a game a game. Others are
fundamental to the development and use of taxonomies in the biological sciences. What
makes orderly classification feasible is that people with appropriate experience are readily
able to recognise similarity, even when it is complex. The same applies to academic
standards. It would be entirely unnecessary to compare every student’s work with the
standard. Competent assessors would make most judgments without reference to standards
documentation, but at any time, the standards anchoring framework is there for periodic
reference in checking judgments.
Obviously, not even a brief excursion through this rich literature is possible here.
Suffice to say that the references included in this article are highly selective, being those
most directly pertinent to the development of the argument and conclusion.
Conclusion
Assuring standards in higher education is a major concern in many countries. Typical
agenda include teaching quality, student satisfaction, student services, resources, spaces,
and more recently, academic achievement standards. For the last of these, the challenge has
been to devise a strategy whereby judgments about the comparability of different levels of
underlying academic achievement can be made by different judges, in different places, at
different times from different evidence. That requires a clear understanding about what
‘underlying achievement’ is, and how it can be manifested and recognised. One particular
approach to the last of these forms the focus for this article.
Projects for developing codified ‘standards’ have engaged in broad consultative pro-
cesses, the expectation being that the resulting explicit specifications will communicate
shared standards and lead to improved integrity in grading. This in turn should enable
higher education institutions and directors of academic programs and courses to be held
more accountable for the quality of academic achievement and graduate learning out-
comes. Discipline-based ‘standards’ codifications can certainly function as valuable tools
for guiding curriculum planning, academic program development, teaching and assess-
ment. Furthermore, consultative processes engaged in during their development can
promote consensus and commitment to the concept of shared standards as academic
values, and to the pursuit of higher-order outcomes integrated with discipline content. But
that is where the benefits of codification stop. They cannot safeguard academic
achievement standards or lead to high levels of comparability in judgments of student
performance.
The key operational elements in codifications of standards generally are criteria (or
qualities) and specified minimum levels on those qualities. A host of codified standards in
industry and commerce can achieve their purpose because their key elements are unam-
biguous and independent of context. However, the analysis in this article has shown that
the key elements in codifications of academic achievement standards lack the appropriate
linguistic properties. They are inherently fuzzy and open to interpretation, and the mini-
mum required levels are invariably expressed in relative rather than absolute terms. This
means that although the overall structures of the two categories of standards may on the
surface appear to be similar, achievement standards codifications cannot deliver on what is
expected of them. A new approach outlined in this article would make use of a different
material form. This, when complemented by appropriate moderation and calibration pro-
cesses described elsewhere, holds out improved prospects for assuring academic
achievement standards.
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